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ABSTRACT
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In a Federal system of government, each unit of government decides independently how
much of each type of public good to provide, and what types of taxes, and which tax rates, to
use in funding the public goods. Many papers have worried about whether any unit of
government will act in the best interests of its citizens.1 In this paper, we ask the broader
question: assuming that each unit of government does in fact act in the best interests of its own
citizens, will the collection of units of government together act in the best interests of all their
citizens. Stated differently, what types of problems can arise from decentralized decision-
making?
The main objective of this paper will be to describe sys.tematically the types of externalities
that a unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions
and its taxation decisions. While a unit of government, acting solely in the interests of its own
citizens, would ignore these externalities, overall social welfare would require that they be taken
into account.
We will also explore briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of
decentralized decision-making. We will explore, for example, the merits of centralizing
provision of the public good, of restricting the types of taxes that local governments can use, of
subsidizing certain types of local government activity, or of transferring tax revenue from the
central government to local governments.
Previous papers have laid some of the ground work for this study. For example, Arnott and
Grieson [1981] examined the optimal behavior of a local government, when nonresideñts pay
some of the taxes and use some of the public facilities. The analysis of local government
behavior here will generalize their study to include such complications as residential mobility
and endogenous prices. Starrett [1980] provides a nice treatment of externalities among units
of government in a setting where each community imposes lump sum taxes on its residents.-2-
The analysis here generalizes Starrett's model to incorporate use of distorting taxes by
communities.
I. General characteristics of the model
The model has the following general characteristics. We assume that there are a finite set of
nonoverlapping communities, which together comprise a self-sufficient economic region. We
therefore examine just a two-tier Federal system —acentral government and many local or
regional governments.2
Individuals choose to live in that community which is most desirable, given their tastes.
They may, however, work elsewhere, enjoy public services elsewhere, and buy goods or own
property elsewhere, though mobility costs will, to varying degrees, implicitly limit the
attractiveness of these activities. Similarly firms in each community can hire factors from other
communities and sell their output in other communities, though transportation costs again limit
the attractiveness of this. Because of transportation costs, prices of goods and factors will vary
by community.
Each unit of government may impose taxes on each of the factors employed by firms in its
community, and on each of the goods sold within (though not necessarily consumed within)
the community. We thus have focused the analysis on what are commonly referred to as
source based factor taxes and origin based commodity taxes. We will comment below on how
the results change with destination based commodity taxes or residence based income taxes —
taxesimposed on goods where consumed and on factors where owned.
Public services are produced by each unit of government. They are made available free of
charge, without exclusion.
Communities are assumed to choose tax and expenditure policies so as to maximize a
Benthamite social welfare function which includes the utility levels of its existing residents. We
therefore assume away a range of public choice problems, not because we think they are-3-
unimportant, but so as to isolate the problems created by decentralized decision-making. In
choosing these policies, we assume that each community takes as given the policies of other
communities.
II. Notation
Let us now develop the specific notation used in the model. Commodities will be indexed
by jandcommunities by k. Thus p represents the price received by a firm for the jth good
in community k, while Vikrepresentsthe price paid by the firm for the jth factor in community
k. In general, prices vary by location. Similarly, qfk represents the price paid by consumers for
the jth good, while WJkrepresentsthe price received for the jth factor, both in community k.
The difference= qk—
Pjkrepresents the excise tax paid on a unit of good j,whilethe
difference t3k =VJk — W1k isthe tax on the jth factor, imposed by community k. The vectors
of prices in community k are denoted by P*k V*k, W*ks,andt*k while the extended
vectors of all prices are denoted by p, v'w, q,s,,and
Thefirms in community k collectively choose a vector of outputs y and a vector of inputs
X*k.Notethat their inputs must be hired in community k, but their outputs can be sold
anywhere. The firms' choices must satisfy the implicit production function f"(.y,x) =
Transportationcosts, for shipping output to other communities, are reflected in negative entries
for some of the elements of y. The firm will choose y andX*k so as to maximize profits
—VX*k, subject to the production constraint. (Here, y denotes the inner
product of the two vectors.) It follows that maximum profits ik are implicitly a function of the
prices faced by the firm: 'w,,Tk(ps*,v*k). For simplification, we also assume that the
production functions have constant returns to scale, and that firms behave competitively, so
that in equilibrium, ik =0.Let us denote aggregate output sold in community n by
Y*n _-4-
ak From duality theory, we know that —y, and also that =— XJk.4We will use
aVIk
these results in the analysis below.
We turn next to the modeling of individual behavior. We assume that there are a finite
number of typesofindividuals. There are many individuals of each type, each with the same
tastes, the same human capital, and the same ownership of other factors. Since individuals are
mobile, all individuals of a given type will have the same utility. Let ulkrepresentthe number
of individuals of type i who choose to locate in community k.
We will treat ulkasa continuous variable, thereby assuming that an individual's location
decision has only marginal impact on other aspects of the model. Eliminating the discrete
choice aspect of individual locational decisions is the primary motivation underlying the
assumption of many types of individuals, each type spread over many communities.
Each individual faces a vector of prices q, for goods and a vector of factor prices w.In
addition, each benefits from the availability of the extended vector of public service levels Q,
whereis the level of the jth service in the kth community.
We assume in general that each type of individual has a unique type of human capital, i.e.,
one that is not a perfect substitute for the human capital of other types of individuals. (Perfect
substitutability will be a special case.) The purpose of this assumption is to provide some
mechanism to prevent all individuals of a given type from concentrating in the same one
community. If they do, their wage rate there will be bid down, while it will rise in other
communities, inducing them to spread out. Let h. denote the human capital of type i, where h.
is a vector of length equal to the number of types of individuals with zero in all entries except
the ith, and one in the ith entry.
Individuals of type I will also own a vector of nonhuman factors zofvarious types in
various communities. Let zdenotethe combined vector of human and nonhuman factors h.
and wherezwillbe of the same dimensions as the vector of firm inputs x..5.
In addition, individuals are assumed to be adversely affected by the degree of congestion Ck
intheir community. Congestion may not only reduce the quality of a given supply of public
goods (e.g. roads or schools), but it may also reduce the quality of the environment (e.g. noise
or pollution). We leave unspecified what factors contribute to congestion, though presume that
the number of residents and the level of production in the community are included among
them.
Individuals of type i in community k will maximize their utility subject to the prices they
face, their endowments of factors, the level of congestion in the community, and the
availability of public services. We can therefore denote their utility level indirectly, by
14k— I — r,w,Ck, **,
Here,k appears explicitly since the attractiveness of purchasing or selling goods in any given
community depends on the community in which the individual lives. (As with the firms,
individuals must buy some of the transportation output in order to participate in the markets in
other communities.)
8 V From duality theory, we know that =— akyj, wherea•,, is the marginal utility of
qjn
incomeof the ith person in the kth community5 and where jkisthe demand by the ith person
8 Vik in the kth community for the jth good sold in the nth community. Similarly, a,kxJ,
In
where4isthe amount of the jth factor supplied in the nth community. Note that the
individual need not supply all of the zftothe market. For example, he can consume leisure.
The treatment of land as a factor merits comment. Since land in community k cannot be
supplied as an input in community 9,weassume that each production function recognizes that
the required transportation costs here are indefinitely large. Also, identical nonhuman factor
ownership for individuals of a given type living in different communities may seem implausible
when land is considered as a factor. We assume here that housing is a service to be purchased,
one of whose inputs is land in that community. Individuals living in a given community will-6-
buy relatively more of the housing service in that community, but will still own just a
representative share of the land in that community.
Let us next consider the activities of the local governments. Tax revenues in community k
will equal Tk —S*k Y*k+ l*k X*k. These tax revenues will be used to buy a vector of
factors b*k, at revenue cost Rkv*k Budget balance implies that Rk =Tk.The
production function for public services in community k will then be denoted by
gk(Q,b)= 0.
Themodeling of the types of taxes communities can use is rather abstract, but includes as
special cases most of the taxes that state or local governments use. For example, a sales tax is
a uniform set of tax rates A nonresidential property tax and a corporate income tax are
both factor taxes on land and capital inputs to production. A residential property tax could be
viewed as a tax on housing services sold within the community. A wage tax on employees
would also be a factor tax, as would be a tax on natural resource inputs to production. Some
taxes, such as an income tax on residents, are currently omitted, mainly for notational
simplification.
In order to close the model, all that is needed in addition are resource constraints and
market clearing constraints. In particular, we must assume that =x+in the
1k
factormarkets, and that y =Yin the output market.
ik
HI. Characterization of optimal government behavior
Since the only taxes available to local governments are distorting, the model cannot in
general lead to a Tiebout equilibrium with full efficiency.6 Therefore, each level of government
faces a second-best problem of how to raise tax revenue with the least loss in welfare. In this
section we will characterize the tax rates and public services levels that communities will
choose.-7-
In doing so, we assume that each level of government acts so as to maximize a Benthamite
social welfare function.7 In particular, we assume that the welfare function of community kis8
Wk = w1uIcV1k
where individuals of type i are given welfare weight w,. Note that community k ignores the
utility of nonresidents when making decisions. Since its decisions may affect the utility of
nonresidents in a variety of ways, externalities will exist with decentralized decision-making. In
order to characterize these externalities, we examine in addition the optimal behavior of local
governments when they fully coordinate their behavior. In particular, we examine the optimal
policy when the coordinated objective function is9
W = ikVik
I k
Note that we have assumed the same welfare weights w for each local government, so do not
allow for inconsistent objectives. The motivation here is to isolate problems arising from
decentralization of decision-making, per Se.
In this context, we cannot assume that the initial income distribution is optimal, so that the
social marginal utility of income for all individuals is the same. For any given type of
individual i, utility levels are equalized due to mobility, and Benthamite social welfare function
must give them equal weight. But marginal utilities of income may well vary across
communities for these individuals. Without restrictions on mobility, this is an inevitable
characteristic of the equilibrium.'0 We therefore must examine distributional as well as
efficiency considerations throughout the analysis.
I. Fully coordinated decision-making
In examining the costs of decentralized decision-making, we start by characterizing tax and
spending behavior when all decisions are coordinated and then examine the decentralized
equilibrium. Assume therefore that the coordinated government can choose the vectors of tax
rates t and s, as well as public service inputsand public service outputs Q,soas to-8-
maximize social welfare. Its decision problem therefore is
mgx
u VIC + + X*— V*k b*k)]+ vkk (A) : I k k
where z is a Lagrangian multiplier on the government budget constraint, and 'y is Lagrangian
multiplier on the public goods production constraint in the kth community. Note that we have
required only that the overall budget constraint be satisfied, and not that each community's
budget constraint be satisfied separately.
When we carry out the differentiation, we derive the following results:
Proposition 1. Optimal coordinated government behavior can be characterized by the following
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Proof The straightforward derivation is found in the Appendix.
Because of the generality of the model, the first-order conditions are rather messy, but the
economic interpretation is still straightforward. Each first-order condition above consists of five
terms. The first measures the direct impact of the policy change. For s and t, it measures
the gain from transferring income from the representative individual to the government. Here,
represents the welfare value of an extra dollar of government revenue, while 0 represents the
welfare value of an extra dollar of income to the representative individual. If lump sum taxes
existed, z would equal 0. Since raising revenue creates efficiency losses, however, the value of
an extra dollar of government revenue, ,wouldnormally exceed the value of a dollar to
individuals, 0.
The first term in the first order condition forrepresents the value of the relaxed
government production constraint relative to the social cost of purchasing the extra The- 10-
firstterm in the equation for Q9representsthe utility gain to individuals of the extra Output
relative to the social cost of the increased production.'2
The second through the fifth terms collectively measure the efficiency and equity costs
created in the process of transferring income to the government, or using the revenue to
provide public services. Their size depends on the degree to which individual behavior, and
equilibrium market prices, change in response to the government action. We see from
equations (la) and (lb) that the difference (i—O)reflectsthe magnitude of these efficiency and
equity costs created by raising government revenue.
The second term in each equation captures any distributional effects of the policy change.
The expression dOkmeasuresthe social value of a dollar to an individual of type iin
community k,relativeto the social value of a dollar to the 'representative individual. The
expression measures the income effect on individuals of type iincommunity kofthe
t9o.j
policy change. The inner product then measures whether the income transfers created by the
policy change are weighted mainly towards the poor (positive value) or mainly towards the rich
(negative value).'3
The third term captures any impact of the policy change on the severity of congestion costs.
Individuals may shift their residence, or production efforts may change location, in response to
the policy change. A move towards less congested communities would be beneficial, and
conversely. Individuals, in making their decisions, do not take into account these externalities.
The fourth term measures any indirect tax revenue effects of the policy change, as
individuals change the amount or location of their market activity. As such, it captures any
efficiency effects arising from this change in behavior. When prices reflect the social costs of
commodities (or the marginal products of factors), changes in individual behavior have no
efficiency consequences. But when taxes exist, one component of the price individuals face,
the tax component, is not a true social cost. As a result, when an individual buys more of a
taxed commodity (or supplies more of a taxed factor), there is a social gain since the utility— 11—
gain to the individual exceeds the social cost of the output (or the utility loss to the individual
falls short of the marginal product) by an amount equal to the tax rate. In equations Ia and ib,
the most important element of this term is undoubtedly the response by individuals to the tax
induced increase in price of the good Yj or the factor x,,.Thisis the only part of the last four
terms not assumed to equal zero when deriving the Ramsey rule for tax rates.14
The final term measures the social cost of raising any additional tax revenue required by
changes in the costs of factor inputs to government production. The difference Cu—O)
implicitly measures the social cost of transferring a dollar from individuals to the government.
2. Decentralized decision-making
We proceed next to provide a formal characterization of the fiscal decisions made by
uncoordinated local governments. We assume that each local government acts independently,
taking as given the fiscal decisions made by other local governments. Clearly, local
governments do in part coordinate their behavior. The point here is not so much to provide a
good positive description of local government behavior as to describe the types of problems
which arise from decentralized decision-making. To what degree local governments have
managed to alleviate these problems in practice through coordination is a separate question.
We assume then that the objective of each local government is to maximize the weighted
sum of the utility of its own residents, subject to a balanced budget constraint, and subject to
the public production function. That is, we assume that each local government behaves so as
to:
mgxu'V+ .Y+ . —' b*f]+ g
s*,*' *' *
Notethat any effects on other individuals or other units of government are ignored. Each local
government carries out this maximization simultaneously, taking as given the actions of other
local governments.- 12-
Whenwe carry out the differentiation, we derive the following results:
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ProofThe derivation is a simple modification of the derivation for Proposition 1.
The intuition underlying these first-order conditions is basically the same as for the fully
coordinated case. Of the six terms in each equation, for all but the last, analogous terms
appeared in the equations in Proposition 1. The key difference is that effects of fiscal decisions
on residents of other communities and on the fiscal position of other governments are all- 13-
ignoredhere.
Let us examine the differences in the first-order conditions in Propositions I and 2 term by
term. The first-term in each of the first-order conditions in Proposition 2 again measures the
direct effects of the policy change. In equations 2a and 2b, however, while all the direct
revenue effects of the tax change are taken into account, only the direct loss to residentsfrom
paying taxes is taken into account. Utility loss to nonresidents from paying taxes is ignored.
To the extent then that nonresidents pay the taxes, as with sales taxes or wage taxes on
nonresidents, these taxes will be used excessively when fiscal authority is decentralized. For
taxes like a corporate income tax, this effect may be substantial.
A comparison of the first terms in equations Id and 2d gives the obvious result that with
decentralized decision making, the value of local public services to nonresidents is ignored.
This type of benefit spillover has been discussed at length in the literature.
The second term continues to capture distributional effects of the policy change. With
decentralized decision-making, however, only redistribution effects on the residents of the
community are taken into account. The distributional pattern of income effects among
nonresidents is ignored. For example, a sales tax increase may be paid essentially equally by
rich and poor residents, but only poor nonresidents may have taken the time to travel in search
of a cheaper price.
The third term captures the effect of any change in congestion in-community Qdueto the
policy change. Effects on congestion elsewhere are ignored. In the fully coordinated case, this
term captured the difference in congestion costs when individuals or production move from one
community to another. In the decentralized case, communities will tend to tax excessively
congestion producing activities, since they experience any gains from decongestion, but ignore
the associated loss from extra congestion elsewhere.
The fourth term captures the effect on tax revenues of any change in individual behavior.
While in the fully coordinated case, effects on total tax revenues are taken into account, in the- 14-
decentralizedcase, effects only on the tax revenues of that community are taken into account.
If cross-price elasticities are zero, then there are no effects on the tax revenues of other
communities. However, in this context, where goods supplied in different communities are
defined to be different goods, the assumption that cross price elasticities are zero is untenable.
For example, the alternative extreme assumption, where a unit decrease in demand for a good
in community kisassociated with approximately a unit increase in demand for the same good
in other communities, would frequently be quite plausible. In this case, with decentralization,
tax rates would be set low, due to the mobility of demand. Since in aggregate, demand would
be extremely inelastic, however, a uniform tax in all communities would be close to
nondistorting. In general, elasticity of demand in one community may have little relation to
the aggregate elasticity of demand, so that the set of tax rates arising in a decentralized setting
need have little relation to those which would be chosen in a coordinated setting. Ability to
relocate demand may be quite different from willingness to reduce demand when prices rise.
The interpretation of the fifth term is similar to that of the previous terms, but the
externalities here are probably much less important. In a decentralized setting, the effect of the
policy change on revenue requirements in that community only is taken into account. In a
coordinated setting, the effect of the policy change on the revenue requirements of all
communities would matter.
Finally, the sixth term in the equations for decentralized behavior did not appear explicitly
previously. This term captures the income effects on residents of community due to price
changes caused by the policy change. This term is analogous to the terms of trade effect which
appears in the optimal tariff literature. In the coordinated setting, the sum of these terms over
all communities appeared in the course of the derivation. Due to competition in production,
the value of inputs minus outputs in private production must remain zero so that in the
— ÔV*k coordinated case this sum reduced to 0 . .Withdecentralization, however,
k
communities would try to gain at the expense of other communities.- 15-
Propositions1 and 2 together provide a formal characterization of the reasons why
decentralized decision-making itself can lead to a less efficient (equitable) outcome. This arises
because one community's decision affects in many ways the utility level of residents of other
communities, yet these effects are ignored in the decision-making. The types of externalities
that appeared in the equations resulting from a given community's decisions were:
(1) Nonresidents may pay some of the taxes.
(2) Nonresidents may receive some of the benefits from public services.
(3) Congestion costs faced by nonresidents may change.
(4) Tax revenues received in other communities may change due to the spillover of
economic activity.
(5)Resourcecosts for public services in other communities may change.
(6) Output and factor price changes may favor residents over nonresidents.
(7) Distributional effects among nonresidents would be ignored.
In certain special cases, externalities may tend to offset, in which case the costs of
decentralized decision-making are minimized. For example, consider the decision-making ofa
central city surrounded by suburbs. The suburban residents benefit from using the city's public
services, benefits ignored in setting public service levels. However, suburban residents alsopay
various taxes to the central city, such as sales taxes, wage taxes on nonresidents, etc. If the city
were to consider a uniform expansion of both taxes and services, it may well be that the benefit
spillover and the tax "spillin" essentially offset, leaving little net externality from these two
terms. 15
Asanother example, consider the externalities created by an individual decision to change
residence as a result of a policy change. In his new community the individualpays extra taxes,
but also adds to congestion; while in his old community he no longerpays (as much in) taxes,
but he also no longer adds to congestion there. This is the setting of the Buchanan-Goetz- 16-
[1972]analysis. If the marginal costs and benefits of gaining or losing a resident just offset,
then again there are no net externalities. That is, the congestion effects on other communities
and the tax revenue effects on other communities may essentially offset, again leaving no net
externality from these two terms.
This is also the setting of the Tiebout [1956] model, at least as formalized by McGuire
[1974]. The above analysis makes clear how strong the assumptions must be to get a Tiebout
type result. To get a Tiebout result, where the public good is supplied in a decentralized setting
with no efficiency costs at all, there must be no net externalities and no net equity or efficiency
costs arising from government behavior. That is, the sum of the seven sources of externalities
listed above must be zero for each of the equations in Proposition 2, so that communities
would in effect act in a coordinated fashion. In addition, the sum of the second, third, fourth,
and fifth terms in each of the equations in Proposition 1, which together measure the equity
and efficiency effects of government behavior, must equal zero.
How does the analysis charge if we have destination-residence based taxes rather than
source-origin based taxes. In particular, what if we tax factors where they are owned and goods
where they are consumed (rather than purchased)? In this case, the tax is paid entirely by
residents so that the first terms in equations la vs. 2a and lb vs. 2b will look the same. All
other externalities will remain, however.
IV. Analysis of Possible Federal Government Remedies
In principle, local governments could negotiate together to correct any of the externalities
described above. However, given the difficulty of conducting negotiations among thousands of
local government units, few of the above externalities are likely to have been corrected for in
this manner. In this section, we therefore explore a number of policies which the Federal
government might use in response to the inefficiencies resulting from decentralized decision-
making)6- 17-
1.Centralized provision of public goods
One obvious policy is to have the Federal government provide all public goods, so that
interactions among communities can be taken into account. However, the Federal government
would normally be constrained to provide a uniform level of public services, and charge
uniform tax rates, even though individual preferences differ. This may occur due to
constitutional constraints or due to inadequate information about local preferences. One of the
key advantages of decentralization is the resulting diversity of policies.
If we accept the constraint requiring uniform public service quality, and uniform tax rates,
by each level of government within its jurisdiction, then it is possible to develop a theory for
the optimal degree of decentralization. The optimal centralized uniform service level, and tax
rates, would be inferior to the optimal diversified service levels described in Proposition 1, and
may or may not be preferable to the diversified service levels, and tax rates, with decentralized
decisions described in Proposition 2. A detailed comparison here would provide guidelines
concerning whether to (or, when there are more than two levels of government, the degree to
which to) decentralize the provision of any given public service.
2. Categorical grants
Local governments will to a degree choose the wrong level and composition of expenditures,
since the size of the spillover to nonresidents will vary by type of expenditure. Categorical or
matching grants provide one device by which the Federal government can induce local
governments to shift their package of public services towards those which provide the most
benefits to nonresidents. An example of a good with large spillovers where such grants have
developed in the U.S. is interstate highways.
3. Tax deductibility of local government taxes
Local governments may also choose too small a level of public services in general. Not only
do nonresidents benefit from extra public services, but also surrounding communities may- 18-
receiveincreased tax revenue as economic activity migrates in response to higher tax rates. On
the other hand, nonresidents pay some of the taxes used to finance extra services, and also
suffer from extra congestion as economic activity shifts into their communities.
If, on net, nonresidents tend to benefit (lose) from expanded public services, then there are
grounds for an overall Federal subsidy (tax) to local public services. One way this is done in
the U.S. is through allowing local public expenditures to be deductible under the Federal
income tax. This particular policy is unattractive, however, in that expenditures are deductible
only for the approximately 20% of tax payers who itemize (generally those with high incomes).
Also, among those who itemize, the subsidy rate equals the individual's marginal tax rate,
which varies substantially across individuals (being highest again for those with the highest
incomes). A refundable tax credit, however, would not be subject to these problems.
4. Revenue sh3ring
Both previous policies change relative prices, and were designed to internalize the effects of
spillovers. They have commonly been argued for on these grounds. (See, for example, Oates
[1972]). The above analysis also suggests a rationalization for direct income transfers from the
Federal government to local governments.
To make the point starkly, consider a tax on the return to capital, where capital is
completely mobile, has by assumption the same productivity everywhere, but is in fixed supply.
Since by assumption capital is perfectly mobile, it will all flow to the community with the lowest
tax rate. Communities will compete for this tax base, and in equilibrium the tax rate on capital
in each community will be driven to zero. However, since also by assumption capital is in fixed
supply, a uniform tax on capital in all locations is completely nondistorting. Therefore, with
centralized decision-making, the optimal tax rate on capital would be very high.
The central government could then impose a uniform tax rate on capital, and redistribute
the revenues in something approximating a nondistorting way, allowing local governments
either to expand expenditures or to reduce other distorting taxes. In effect, the central- 19-
governmentprovides the mechanism by which local governments can coordinate their tax
policies and take into account the effect each local government's action has on the revenues of
other local governments.
In general, the Federal government will not be indifferent to how the revenue is distributed
across local governments. For example, the size of the efficiency (equity) gain when a
community lowers its taxes, or increases its expenditures, in response to a dollar received in
revenue sharing may vary widely by community. The Federal government would then have the
incentive to give relatively more in revenue sharing to communities where the efficiency
(equity) gain would be largest.
To the extent that the amount of revenue a community gets back depends on its actions,
however, complications arise due to these price distortions. For example, consider the situation
where all the revenues collected from a community are returned to that community. Then, the
community can completely offset the effects of the Federal action by lowering its own tax rate
by an amount equal to the Federal tax rate. In principle, the decentralized equilibrium would
remain unchanged by the Federal action. However, communities would normally be
constrained to charge positive tax rates. If the Federal tax rate exceeds the decentralized tax
rate, as we expect, then the Federal action would accomplish the desired end.
5. Federal reau!ation of permissible local tax bases
In the case of revenue sharing, we considered the situation where in the decentralized
equilibrium a particular tax rate is relatively too low. The Federal government can then impose
a higher tax rate. In situations where nonresidents pay an important share of a particular tax,
however, the tax rate may be set too high. Examples of this situation may be severance fees,
and perhaps state corporate income taxes. What remedies exist in this case?
The most obvious, and extreme, remedy is to forbid local governments from using such tax
bases at all. In some cases, this may be an improvement, though a zero tax rate may be
inefficiently low. An alternative might be to legislate a maximum permissible tax rate, set at- 20-
thedesired value.
V.Conclusion
There may be many advantages to decentralizing government decision-making. Local
governments, being "closer to the people," may better reflect individual preferences. The
diversity of policies of local governments allows individuals to move to that community best
reflecting their tastes. Competition among communities should lead to greater efficiency and
innovation. However, this paper has shown the many ways in which decentralized decision-
making can lead to inefficiencies, since a local government will ignore the effects of its
decisions on the utility levels of nonresidents.
The paper shows that certain taxes may be used excessively, such as when nonresidents pay
an important fraction of the tax. Other taxes may be used too little, since for example the
increase in tax revenue in neighboring communities, as economic activity spills over to avoid a
tax increase, would not be taken into account when communities act independently. These
efficiency problems with decentralized decision-making imply the potential for efficiency gains
through regulation by the Federal government of what tax bases local governments can use,
and through transfer of Federal tax revenue to local governments.APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Direct differentiation of equation A with respect to s gives:













Note that the second term equals zero, since Vik has the same value for all k, and since the
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Using duality theory, we can then reexpress the first term as 8s l9SjfôS
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If we substitute for o,the expression 0 + d 0k' the first term becomes the following:
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That profits remain zero in equilibrium implies that the second term in equation (A.3) equals
zero. Equation Ia in the text follows simply. Equations lb. lc, and ld follow in a similar
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*Thispaper was presented at the ISPE Conference on Taxation in Federal Systems in
Canberra, Australia, on August 25,1982.I would like to thank Fischer Black, Dieter Bös,
Bhajan Grewel, Michelle White, and especially Charles E. McLure, Jr., for comments on
an earlier draft. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not
represent those of Bell Laboratories or of the Bell System.
1.See, for example, Buchanan [1968] and Niskanen [19681.
2.Nothing of substance would be changed if the analysis were extended to three levels of
government.
3.For simplification, we ignore any contribution of public goods to production.
4.To show this, note that rk =p . — V*k X*k, evaluatedat the optimal values of
and X*k.Differentiatingwith respect to Pjn gives:
____ k BX1k =Yjn+PjVjk Pn Pjn j Pin
When y,, and X*karechosen so as to maximize profits subject to the production
constraint, we have first-order conditions: p =— X -— andVik= X Substituting
oyi ôXjk
all-k 8fk andsimplifying gives: = — A-'-——.Sincefk= 0always, the result follows.
UPjn h'Pjn
5.Whileutility is the same across communities for the ith type, marginal utility need not be
the same, a point emphasized by Mirrlees [1972].
6.If the supply of a factor has zero elasticity, as with land, then a tax on that factor is
nondistorting. However, even in this setting, a Tiebout equilibrium may still not arise for
many of the reasons described below. For example, if new residents add more (or less)
to congestion costs than they do to tax revenues, then locational decisions will still create
externalities. Hamilton [1975] has shown that if communities can impose quantity
restrictions, e.g. zoning, then a Tiebout type equilibrium might be possible. We do not
allow for such restrictions here.
7.These welfare functions could be reinterpreted as merely representing Pareto optimizing
behavior by each government. The objective of a Pareto optimizing government would be
to maximize the utility level of type Qindividualssubject to the constraints that V&￿ V"
for all other types ik, for some utility levels V. Put algebraically, the objective function,
subject to constraints, would be
max 0k+a, (Vik_V)
where the w1representLagrangian multipliers. If the Lagrangian weights here are the
same as the welfare weights in the text, optimal behavior will also be the same.
8.We assume that the utility of the residents at the time of the decision enters into the
objective function, rather than the utility of those who would be present in response to
any policy change.
9.Optimal behavior when coordination occurs is not necessarily intended here as a
description of policy if all decisions were made by the central government. For example,F-2
wewill assume below that a central government would be required to provide uniform
service levels, and charge uniform tax rates, in all jurisdictions.
10. For further discussion, see Mirrlees [1972].
11. While first-order conditions must be satisfied at the optimal outcome, they may also be
satisfied elsewhere. Second-order conditions in this context need not necessarily be
satisfied. See, for example, Stiglitz [19771. We assume in the discussion that the desired
equilibrium has, in fact, been reached.
12. Note that, ignoring all but the first terms, the sum of equations ic and id gives the
Samuelson [19541 optimal condition for pure public goods.
13. The tax incidence literature, which analyzes the degree to which labor, capital, or some
other group, bears the burden of particular taxes, focuses on the nature of the equilibrium
price changes which result from tax policy. For example, to what degree does a tax on
capital income result in a rise in the before tax interest rate (due to a drop in the
equilibrium capital stock), thereby lessening the loss to capital owners. In the analysis
here, the direct effect of the tax payment appears in the first term, while the offsetting
effect of price changes appears in the second term. We do not attempt to anJyze the
magnitude of these offsetting price changes. Presumably, the effect of marginal changes
in any one community's tax policy on market prices (the context of these first order
conditions) is small, though the effect of these changes in aggregate could be large. See
Mieszkowski [1972] for further discussion.
14.Technically, in deriving the Ramsey rule, the Slutsky equation would be used to
decompose the fourth term into price and income effects. All but the own price effects
are then assumed to equal zero.
15. For further discussion, see Bradford and Oates [1974].
16.If these policies are pursued, yet local governments do in fact coordinate their policies,
then there may be overcorrection for the externalities, with resulting inefficiencies.